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AI AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR MARKET: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATION AND THE NEW EMPLOYMENT UNCERTAINTY

Abstract. This study analyzes the socio-economic implications of artificial intelligence (AI) and generative AI (GenAI) deployment within global and national labor markets during the 2025–2026 transition period. Employing a secondary quantitative analysis of recent reports from the World Economic Forum (WEF), International Labor Organization (ILO), McKinsey, and PwC, alongside national data from Kazakhstan's Center for Human Resources Development, the research evaluates the scale of structural labor transformation. Findings indicate a global net gain of 78 million jobs by 2030, masking a profound churn where 22% of employment undergoes structural change and 39% of current skills become obsolete. A critical dimension of this shift is the gendered risk of automation; women in high-income countries face a risk nearly three times higher than men due to their concentration in administrative roles. In Kazakhstan, the implementation of the «Law on AI» (2026) and the «Alem. AI» ecosystem marks a proactive state response to the potential transformation of 2.2 million workers. However, the study identifies the emergence of «Precariousness 2.0» a state of manufactured uncertainty characterized by a loss of professional autonomy and chronic anxiety. The research concludes that while the paradigm has shifted from «substitution» to «augmentation» the resulting «AI precariat» requires institutional interventions focusing on gender-sensitive retraining, regional R&D equity, and the mitigation of «cultural debt» to ensure social stability.

Keywords: *Artificial intelligence, labor market, automation, employment uncertainty, social consequences, gender inequality, retraining, Kazakhstan.*

Нурлан Байгабылов, Алимжан Есенов
ЖАСАНДЫ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТ ЖӘНЕ ЕҢБЕК НАРЫҒЫНЫҢ
ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯСЫ: АВТОМАТТАНДЫРУДЫҢ ӘЛЕУМЕТТІК
САЛДАРЫ ЖӘНЕ ЖАҢА ЖҰМЫС ОРНЫНЫҢ БЕЛГІСІЗДІГІ

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада жаһандық және ұлттық еңбек нарықтарында жасанды интеллект (ЖИ) енгізудің әлеуметтік салдары талданады. Дүниежүзілік экономикалық форумның, Халықаралық еңбек ұйымының, McKinsey Global AI Survey, PwC Global Workforce Hopes and Fears Survey деректерін және Қазақстаннан алынған ұлттық дереккөздерді пайдалана отырып, мақалада жұмыс орындарын құру мен жою ауқымы, генеративті ЖИ-ге кәсіби әсер ету деңгейі, гендерлік және аймақтық теңсіздіктер және жұмысшылар арасында жұмыспен қамту белгісіздігінің артуы қарастырылады. Әдістеме ресми статистика мен

сауалнамалардың екінші реттік сандық талдауы болып табылады. Нәтижелер жұмыс орындарының таза өсуін, бірақ бар лауазымдардың айтарлықтай өзгеруін, жұмысшылардың GenAI-ге ұшырауын және компаниялардың жоғары пайызында жұмыс күшінің қысқаруы күтілетінін көрсетеді. Қазақстанда функциялардың жартысына дейін ішінара автоматтандырылады, бұл 2,2 миллион адамға дейін әсер етеді. Теңсіздіктің арту қаупі, психологиялық стресс және қайта даярлау саясатының қажеттілігі талқыланады. Мақалада «алмастыру» парадигмасынан еңбекті «трансформациялауға» ауысу атап өтіледі және әлеуметтік қорғау бойынша ұсыныстар ұсынылады.

***Түйін сөздер:** жасанды интеллект, еңбек нарығы, автоматтандыру, жұмыспен қамтудың белгісіздігі, әлеуметтік салдарлар, гендерлік теңсіздік, қайта даярлау, Қазақстан.*

Нурлан Байгабылов, Алимжан Есенов
ИИ И ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ РЫНКА ТРУДА: СОЦИАЛЬНЫЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ АВТОМАТИЗАЦИИ И НОВАЯ НЕОПРЕДЕЛЕННОСТЬ НА РЫНКЕ ТРУДА

Аннотация. В данной статье анализируются социальные последствия внедрения искусственного интеллекта (ИИ) на глобальном и национальном рынках труда. Используя данные Всемирного экономического форума, Международной организации труда, глобального исследования ИИ от McKinsey, глобального исследования надежд и опасений рабочей силы от PwC, а также национальные источники из Казахстана, статья рассматривает масштабы создания и сокращения рабочих мест, уровень профессионального воздействия генеративного ИИ, гендерные и региональные различия, а также рост неопределенности в сфере занятости среди работников. Методология представляет собой вторичный количественный анализ официальной статистики и опросов. Результаты показывают чистый рост числа рабочих мест, но значительную трансформацию существующих должностей, воздействие генеративного ИИ на работников и ожидания сокращения численности персонала в значительном проценте компаний. В Казахстане до половины функций будут частично автоматизированы, что затронет до 2,2 миллиона человек. Обсуждаются риски усиления неравенства, психологического стресса и необходимость политики переподготовки. В статье подчеркивается переход от парадигмы «замещения» к парадигме «трансформации» труда и предлагаются рекомендации по социальной защите.

Ключевые слова: искусственный интеллект, рынок труда, автоматизация, неопределённость занятости, социальные последствия, гендерное неравенство, переобучение, Казахстан.

Introduction

In March 2026, artificial intelligence (AI), particularly generative models (GenAI), emerged from the experimental phase and became a systemic factor in transforming the global labor market. According to key 2025-26 reports such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) Future of Jobs Report 2025, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Generative AI and Jobs: A 2025 Update, the McKinsey Global AI Survey 2025, the PwC Global Workforce Hopes and

Fears Survey 2025, as well as updated data from the OECD and IMF, AI is simultaneously a driver of productivity and a source of new social uncertainty.

The WEF predicts that by 2030, structural changes driven by technology (primarily AI and data processing – 86% of employers expect business transformation), demographic shifts, the green transition, and geoeconomic fragmentation will affect 22% of all jobs globally. This equates to the creation of 170 million new positions and the loss of 92 million, with a net gain of 78 million (7% of current employment). However, these figures conceal a profound restructuring: 39% of existing skills will become obsolete, and 59 out of 100 workers will need retraining in the next five years.

Sociological perspectives emphasize that AI isn't simply replacing routine tasks—it's radically changing the nature of work, increasing inequality and creating a "new job uncertainty" (precariousness 2.0). Unlike previous waves of automation (Industrial Revolution 4.0), which primarily impacted low-skilled physical labor, GenAI is affecting cognitive and non-routine tasks: data analysis, writing, programming, customer service, and legal and financial analytics. ILO 2025 estimates the global occupational exposure to GenAI at 25% of workers (with "some" exposure), with 3.3% of employment falling into the highest-risk category. In high-income countries, women are three times more likely than men to face a high risk of automation (9.6% of female employment versus 3.2% of male employment), as they predominate in administrative and clerical roles.

This disparity exacerbates gender inequality: research by Stanford (2025) and ILO shows that GenAI reinforces stereotypes – women's resumes are generated as "younger and less experienced," and older women receive lower competency ratings. Women are also less likely to use AI (20% less than men) due to ethical concerns, fear of bias, and lower representation in AI development (less than 30% of the global AI workforce).

The psychological aspect of uncertainty is particularly acute: Pew Research (2025) found that 52% of American workers are worried about the future of AI, 32% expect a reduction in opportunities, and Mercer Global Talent Trends 2026 notes an increase in anxiety about job loss from 28% in 2024 to 40% in 2026. Workers feel "replaceable" and "invisible" (APA Monitor, 2026), leading to decreased engagement, stress, and a loss of career control. In the sociological literature, this is described as an "age of uncertainty," where economic volatility, politics, and AI create chronic anxiety.

In Kazakhstan, these processes are being accelerated by government policy. The Law on AI (No. 230-VIII, November 2025, entered into force in January 2026), the creation of the Ministry of AI and Digital Development, the Alem.AI platform, and the goal of training 1 million people by 2030 reflect an ambitious approach. The Center for Human Resources Development estimates that 29% of functions are subject to automation, 13% are directly related to AI, and up to 53% of professions will be transformed by 2035 – affecting up to 2.2 million people (almost a quarter of the workforce). Furthermore, AI can improve the productivity of 70% of workers, adding 0.5–2% to annual GDP growth.

However, local challenges are significant: regional disparities (urban vs. rural), low levels of corporate R&D, and insufficient "social readiness" of

society (Oxford Insights Government AI Readiness Index 2025 – 58th place, an improvement of 16 places). Without proactive measures (retraining, gender-sensitive policies), uncertainty could escalate into social tension.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the social consequences of AI automation through the lens of new employment uncertainty, using data from 2025-2026. Objectives include assessing the scale of change, gender and regional aspects, worker risk perceptions, a case study from Kazakhstan, and recommendations. A novel feature is the integration of global reports with national data and a focus on the sociological aspect: from technological determinism to managed transformation, where people remain at the center.

Literature review

Theoretical Framework: Risk Society and Precariousness 2.0. Applying Ulrich Beck's «Risk Society» theory to the 2026 labor landscape reveals that AI-driven transformation is a primary source of «manufactured uncertainty». Precariousness 2.0 represents a evolution of employment insecurity where the risk of obsolescence is no longer a peripheral threat but a core structural feature of professional life. This creates a state of chronic anxiety and a pervasive sense of replaceability, as the pace of AI integration outstrips the ability of traditional social safety nets and educational systems to provide stability.

Bourdieu and Social Stratification: The Erosion of Habitus. Integrating Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of social and cultural capital, the AI transition threatens the established «habitus» of the professional class. The rise of algorithmic management leads to a significant degradation of professional autonomy a key component of cultural capital. As AI automates specialized cognitive tasks, an «AI precariat» emerges: a cohort of workers who, despite high educational attainment, experience a loss of career control, purpose, and social status. This erosion of professional identity signifies a downward shift in social stratification for roles once considered immune to automation.

Algorithmic Bias and Gender Skepticism. Research from Nature (2025) and Stanford (2025) identifies systemic age and gender distortions within Large Language Models (LLMs). These studies demonstrate that GenAI often reinforces archaic stereotypes; for example, resumes for women are frequently generated or categorized as «less experienced» while older women receive lower competency ratings than their younger or male counterparts. These biases serve as digital barriers, reinforcing the «glass ceiling» in the high-tech economy.

Psychological and Behavioral Responses. Data published in PNAS Nexus (2026) indicates a widening gender gap in AI adoption, rooted in women's skepticism regarding the technology's ethical implications and potential for bias. This skepticism is compounded by broader workforce anxiety: Mercer's Global Talent Trends 2026 reports that job loss anxiety has surged from 28% in 2024 to 40% in 2026. This psychological burden a feeling of being «invisible» and «replaceable» erodes organizational engagement and fuels institutional mistrust.

Method and data

The study relies exclusively on secondary quantitative and qualitative analysis of authoritative sources for 2025–2026, ensuring the relevance and reliability of the data in a rapidly changing field. Key datasets:

- WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025 – a survey of over 1,000 employers (14+ million workers, 55 economies, 22 industries). The data includes forecasts for job creation/dislocation, business transformation (86% AI), skills evolution (AI/big data top growth), and macro trends (technology, green transition, demographics).

- ILO Generative AI and Jobs: A 2025 Update – a global exposure index based on 30,000 ISCO-08 tasks. Key metrics: 25% of workers with some exposure, 3.3% highest gradation, gender gap (women 3.7-7.8% of full automation potential versus men 1.4-2.9%).

- McKinsey Global AI Survey 2025 – a survey of executives: 88% of companies are using AI, 32% expect workforce reductions of $\geq 3\%$, 43% unchanged, and 13% growth.

- PwC Global Workforce Hopes and Fears Survey 2025 – thousands of respondents: 54% have used AI in the past year, 14% use GenAI daily; wage growth is twice as fast in AI-exposed industries.

- OECD Employment Outlook 2025 and IMF Bridging Skill Gaps 2026 – data on exposure (40% of global jobs), decline in employment in vulnerable occupations (-3.6% in regions with high demand for AI skills), and bonuses for new skills (+3% wages).

National sources for Kazakhstan: Center for Human Resources Development (29% of functions automated, 53% transformed by 2035, 2.2 million affected); reports of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (training 1 million by 2030); Astana Times and Kazinform (70% productivity growth, 0.5-2% of GDP); Oxford Insights AI Readiness Index 2025 (58th place).

National Sources (Kazakhstan):

- Center for Human Resources Development: Data on 2.2 million affected workers.

- Ministry of Science and Higher Education: Reports on AI training targets for 2030.

- National Legislation: Law on AI (No. 230-VIII, 2026).

Methodology: descriptive statistics, comparative analysis (global vs. Kazakhstan), visualization (charts, tables). Data is extracted from open publications and verified for consistency (e.g., WEF/ILO converge on net growth and exposure).

Limitations: secondary analysis excludes causal inferences at the micro level; forecasts to 2030-2035 do not take into account unexpected breakthroughs (agentic AI) or regulatory changes; The focus on formal employment (ILO/WEF) underestimates the informal sector in developing economies like Kazakhstan.

Results


The analysis revealed a paradoxical dynamic: AI simultaneously creates and destroys jobs, but the primary social impact is not mass unemployment, but

rather new job uncertainty and the need for constant adaptation. The global scale of these changes is presented in the WEF report. By 2030, 170 million new jobs are expected to be created (14% of current employment) and 92 million jobs will be lost (8%), resulting in a net gain of 78 million (7%). Structural transformation will affect 22% of all jobs.

Table 1. Forecast of job creation and destruction by macrotrends (WEF, 2025, million)

Macrotrend	Creation	Reduction	Net Effect
Expanding digital access	19,9	9,1	+10,8
AI and information processing	11,0	9,0	+2,0
Robotization	-	5,0	-5,0
Demographic shifts	5,5	3,1	+2,4
Green transition	3,8	0,7	+3,1


Figure 1. WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025: Global Labour Market Changes by 2030 (million jobs)



The fastest-growing occupations (by percentage) are big data specialists, fintech engineers, AI and machine learning specialists, and software developers. In absolute terms, these include nurses, social workers, and teachers. Jobs experiencing declines include clerks, cashiers, administrative assistants, and data entry operators.


The impact of generative AI (ILO 2025) affects one in four workers globally (25% of occupations have some impact). The average automation score is 0.29. The highest gradation is 3.3% of employment. Most occupations will be transformed, not replaced (the need for human input remains).

Figure 2. ILO 2025: Global occupational exposure to generative AI (%)



The gender dimension exacerbates inequality: the potential for full automation is higher among women (3.7% globally versus 1.4% among men; in high-income countries, 7.8% versus 2.9%). Women predominate in the most vulnerable segments (clerical workers).

Figure 3. Potential for automation of AI professions by gender (ILO, %)



1. Employee risk perception (McKinsey and PwC 2025): 88% of companies are already using AI, but only a third have scaled it. 32% of organizations expect headcount reductions of $\geq 3\%$ in the next year (43% unchanged, 13% growth). Among employees, 54% have used AI in the past year, and 14% use GenAI daily. Optimism outweighs anxiety (employees are twice as likely to express curiosity as fear), but among younger workers (entry-level), anxiety reaches 30-33%.

Figure 4. McKinsey 2025: Expected Impact of AI on Organizational Workforce Size (%)






Figure 5. PwC 2025: AI Use by Workers (%)



Kazakhstan case. According to the Center for Human Resource Development, 29% of job functions are subject to automation, 13% are directly related to AI, and up to 53% will be transformed by 2035. This will affect up to 2.2 million people (almost a quarter of the workforce). AI will improve the productivity of approximately 70% of workers. AI courses have already been introduced at all universities, with approximately 1 million people trained (by 2025), and the target is 5 million by 2030. The Law on AI (2025) has been passed, and the Ministry of AI and the Alem.AI platform have been established.

Figure 6. Impact of AI on the labor market of Kazakhstan (%)



Discussion

The results confirm a fundamental shift from the "labor substitution" paradigm to a "transformation and augmentation" model. The net gain of 78 million jobs by 2030 (WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025) masks significant churn the structural restructuring of 22% of all employment. AI does not lead to mass job destruction in the near term, as feared in early forecasts, but it does radically alter the content of work: routine cognitive tasks are automated, and human contribution shifts toward creativity, emotional intelligence, ethical oversight, and complex decision-making. This requires workers to constantly adapt continuously learn and restructure their professional identity, giving rise to "new employment uncertainty" as a chronic social condition.

Sociologically, this uncertainty manifests itself in several dimensions. First, psychological: chronic anxiety, a sense of replaceability, and a loss of career control. According to the APA Monitor (2026), workers increasingly feel "invisible" and "replaceable" in the age of AI, leading to decreased engagement, emotional burnout, and existential doubt about their own usefulness. Pew Research (2025) records that 52% of American workers are concerned about the future impact of AI, and Mercer Global Talent Trends 2026 shows an increase in anxiety about job loss from 28% in 2024 to 40% in 2026. Globally, this creates an "age of uncertainty," where economic volatility, geopolitics, and technological shocks overlap, exacerbating feelings of chronic stress. Young professionals (Gen-Z and entry-level) are particularly vulnerable: the Stanford Digital Economy Lab (2025) notes a decline in employment among 22-25-year-olds in highly exposed occupations, where AI is replacing junior tasks traditional entry points into careers. This could lead to long-term declines in income, delayed independence, and increased intergenerational inequality.

Second, stratification: AI amplifies the digital divide. Highly skilled white-collar workers are most vulnerable to exposure (OECD Employment Outlook 2025), but also reap the greatest benefits the wage premium for AI skills reaches

+3% (IMF 2026). Low-skilled and semi-skilled workers, on the other hand, face the risk of task degradation or complete automation. The gender aspect is particularly acute: ILO (2025) emphasizes that women are three times more likely than men to fall into high-risk occupations, as they predominate in administrative, clerical, and client-facing roles. Stanford (2025) adds that GenAI reinforces gender stereotypes in content generation (resumes for women are rated as "less experienced"), and women are less likely to use AI due to ethical concerns and fear of bias the adoption gap reaches 20%. This exacerbates existing disparities in pay and career advancement.

Third, institutional: the acceleration of change (years versus decades of previous automation) requires proactive policies. The WEF indicates that 85% of employers are planning retraining programs, but real scaling remains a challenge. Without mandatory reskilling, transitional measures (such as a universal basic income or training subsidies), and regulation of algorithmic management, uncertainty will escalate into social instability. The IMF (2026) warns that anxiety has already reached 40%, and without action, it could provoke increased protests and a decline in trust in institutions. Deloitte (2025) introduces the concept of "cultural debt" the accumulation of mistrust and normative misalignment due to ignoring the impact of AI on human interactions, which undermines organizational cohesion.

In the context of Kazakhstan, public policy (the 2025 AI Law, the Alem. AI platform, the goal of training 1 million people by 2030) softens the blow by focusing on augmentation (increasing the productivity of 70% of workers). However, regional disparities remain critical: urban centers (Astana, Almaty) benefit from digital transformation, while agricultural and resource-rich regions lag behind, exacerbating migration and inequality (Astana Times 2026; Preprints. org 2025). Without targeted measures (local retraining centers, gender-sensitive programs), the technological transition risks deepening existing gaps between urban and rural areas, skilled and low-skilled workers, and men and women. A comparison with previous waves of automation (Industrial Revolution 4.0, robotics) reveals key differences: the current wave affects cognitive labor, is accelerated by exponential technology growth, and is accompanied by global anxiety (CNBC 2026: "AI impacting labor market like a tsunami"). Unlike in the past, where adaptation took decades, companies are now freezing hiring in anticipation of productivity (Investor's Business Daily 2026), and young people are facing "closed doors" in their professions.

Future research should focus on longitudinal effects: how chronic uncertainty affects mental health (depression, anxiety disorders), intergenerational mobility (delayed career start for Gen-Z), and the role of public sociology in alleviating fears (educational campaigns, dialogue with employees). It is important to study the "AI precariat" a new group of precarious workers in the digital economy, where the loss of purpose, identity, and social status is becoming a systemic threat (WEF 2025). Only through the integration of sociological approaches (from Bourdieu to Becca) can we move from reactive measures to proactive transformation management, where AI serves as an instrument of social justice rather than an accelerator of inequality.

Conclusion

Artificial intelligence is radically transforming the labor market, creating more opportunities than it destroys: according to the WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025, a net gain of 78 million jobs is expected by 2030 (170 million created versus 92 million lost), with 22% of current employment undergoing structural changes. However, the main social threat is not mass unemployment, but a new level of job uncertainty: chronic anxiety, loss of career control, a sense of replaceability, and increasing inequality. Global data confirms this: the ILO (2025 update) records exposure to generative AI among 25% of workers, with a significant gender imbalance women are almost twice as likely as men to be in highly exposed occupations (29% female-dominated versus 16% male-dominated), particularly in administrative and service roles. The McKinsey Global AI Survey 2025 shows that 32% of organizations expect a workforce reduction of at least 3% in the coming year, while only 13% plan to grow. These figures highlight a paradox: AI improves productivity but simultaneously increases the vulnerability of certain groups.

The case of Kazakhstan illustrates how global trends are manifesting in a developing economy. According to estimates by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the Center for Workforce Development, up to 53% of job functions will be transformed by 2035, affecting up to 2.2 million people (almost a quarter of the workforce). AI could improve productivity for approximately 70% of workers and add 0.5-2% to annual GDP growth in the medium term. Unlike many countries, Kazakhstan is actively responding: 2026 was declared the Year of Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence, the Law on AI was adopted (came into force in January 2026), the Ministry of AI and Digital Development was created, and the national platform Alem.AI was launched as the center of the ecosystem (competitions, data access, international cooperation), as well as the AI Qyzmet (for government employees) and AI Corporate (for businesses) programs. The plan is to train 1 million people in AI skills by 2030 (500,000 schoolchildren, 300,000 students, 90,000 government employees, etc.), with approximately 1 million already trained by 2025. Over 1,000 new professions and 540 transforming ones have been identified, allowing for a reorientation of the labor market.

Key lessons from the analysis: AI is not a replacement for humans, but an augmentation tool that enhances human capabilities in most cases; gender and skills gaps require priority action (women are 2-3 times more likely to be at high risk, ILO 2026 brief); uncertainty is primarily a social challenge, affecting mental health, engagement, and social stability. Without managed transformation, the risks will outweigh the benefits: a widening digital divide, increased anxiety (already 40% globally, Mercer 2026), and potential instability.

Recommendations include: large-scale retraining (AI skills + resilience and soft skills), gender-sensitive policies (targeted training for women, combating bias in algorithms), social dialogue (tripartism between employers, trade unions, and the state), and the regulation of bias and algorithmic governance. Kazakhstan needs to strengthen Alem.AI as a true "flywheel" ecosystem (access to computing, datasets, and mentoring), monitor regional disparities (urban vs.

rural, with rural and resource-rich regions lagging behind), integrate AI into education at all levels (from schools to universities, including AI University and Tomorrow School), and develop transitional measures (tuition subsidies, pilot universal basic income programs for vulnerable groups). Only then will AI become a tool for social justice, sustainable development, and inclusive growth, rather than a source of new stratification and inequality.

The future depends on how quickly society shifts from reactive adaptation to proactive change management. The sociology of labor plays a key role here: monitoring the effects on mental health, intergenerational mobility, and occupational identity will allow for timely policy adjustments. Kazakhstan, with its ambitious strategy and institutional foundation, has the potential to become a regional leader in AI-driven transformation, demonstrating that technological progress can serve people rather than threaten them.

The transition to an AI-driven economy presents a paradox: unprecedented productivity gains juxtaposed with scaled vulnerability and employment uncertainty. To manage this transition, the following is recommended:

- Holistic Retraining: Education must integrate AI technical proficiency with soft skills (resilience, ethics) that are resistant to automation.
- Gender-Sensitive Regulation: Implementation of targeted training for women and strict monitoring of recruitment algorithms to eliminate the digital glass ceiling identified by Stanford (2025).
- Strengthening Alem.AI: Transforming the platform into a "flywheel" ecosystem that provides rural regions with computing access and mentoring to bridge the R&D gap.
- Social Safety Measures: Exploring transitional measures such as tuition subsidies or pilot basic income programs for workers in "transforming" professions.

The role of public sociology in 2026 is to shift the narrative from reactive adaptation to proactive social justice, ensuring that technological progress serves human needs rather than exacerbating existing inequalities.

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